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Abstract: 
This paper starts with an initial  gesture accepting the 
validity of many of the criticisms of modernity by some 
leading postmodern thinkers.From this initial position, it 
then evalutess the postmodernist positions themselves with 
regards to democracy and justice by paying careful attention 
to the arguments of these leading postmodernists  Following 
this procedure, Lyotard's characterization of the discourse 
on morality and justice as phrase-regimes can be shown to 
lead to an ethical impasse.  His appeal to the Kantian 
sublime, in this context, would seem to be a category 
mistake.  The aesthetic category of sublime does not fit the 
requirements of moral judgments even in Kantian terms. 
Epistemologically, the postmodern dilemma arises from a 
correct critique of metaphysics and transcendentalism.  
However, the critique is partial and negative.  It is 
partial in the sense that it does not take the challenge of 
Kant to develop normativity seriously enough to explore 
alternatives as Hegel did.  It, therefore, pursues entirely 
the negative critical path leading to thoroughgoing 
skepticism and nihilism.Derrida's belated attempts to rescue 
philosophy from a linguistic nihilism may succeed.  But it 
still falls far short of offering a positive account of 
normativity.This paper  offere as an alternative to natural 
law and transcendental norms an approach based on Hegel's 
explorations in dialectics.  Following this alternative 
offers a way of exploring democracy and economic justice.  A 
concrete set of institutions consistent with the development 
of self-determination can be seen as necessary for the idea 
of economic justice to have meaning.  In the spheres of 
production, distribution, exchange, law and contracts among 
others, the development of appropriate economic and 
political institutions allowing this inter-subjective idea 
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of freedom to unfold becomes the thematic development of 
economic justice.At the microlevel, by carefully considering 
poststructuralist psychoanalytical theory of Lacan and 
others a dynamically oriented approach to the question of 
the subject becomes possible.  Pre-Freudian thinkers such as 
Hegel or Marx did not see the formation of the individual in 
all its deeply problematic aspects.A continuum of 
subjectivity ending with the fully liberated individual 
offers various possible levels of moral agency.  In an 
economically and socially unjust setting radical analytic 
and social interventions will be necessary for these 
possibilities to materialize. 
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 Is the talk of democracy or rights or justice sensible? 
Are there facts of the matter, as a Humean might ask? Or, is 
such talk either tautological, or worse, a complete fiction? 
Such skeptical thoughts may seem inappropriate to practical-
minded people cheering for global democracy, as if it is 
already here, or at worst on the way. As if echoing E. M. 
Forster's two cheers for democracy 1   we are witnessing a 
global spectacle of democratic rhetoric. However, whether 
this rhetoric resembles reality or is altogether a 
simulacrum displayed on a mass scale to a global audience is 
a difficult question to answer. The rhetoric on democracy 
has also been joined by the rhetoric of free markets. This 
juxtaposition of democracy and markets makes it even more 
difficult to sort out the relationships that create the 
ensemble we may choose to call the political economy of 
democracy. Postmodern technology and discourse both have a 
deep and ambiguous role to play in this ensemble.  We need 
to know what this role is precisely. 
In this paper I want to argue that getting the theory 
right is crucial if we are ever to make our way beyond the 
rhetorical assertions regarding rights, markets, democracy 
                     
1 E. M. Forster (1951), ‘What I believe’ in Two Cheers for 
Democracy, New York: Harcourt and Brace, p. 70. 
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and justice. Although I begin in a (postmodern) Humean note 
of skepticism, my ultimate purpose is to go beyond both 
modernist social science and postmodern nihilism. 
Challenging the fashions in this manner is not always 
fashionable. But going beyond the tired old dogmas of human 
rights and democracy while staying clear of a shallow 
skepticism that leads ultimately to relativism and nihilism 
demands defying the codes of contemporary academic fashion. 
The argument that unfolds begins by interrogating the 
postmodern deconstruction of modernism and then goes beyond 
such deconstructive gestures. I promise the reader that 
eventually fictions are read as fictions in order to uncover 
deeper frictions in the heart of our socio-economic world 
and discourses about such a world. Such a reading of 
fictions of the political and the economic marketplace also 
shows the fictions to be “factions”, i.e., a mixture of 
facts and fictions, arising from and leading towards a 
certain structure of social action. The end result is the 
discovery that a deep theory of democracy can critically 
expose the limits of the superficial attempts to build a 
democratic global society. At the same time it offers a more 
radical and profound motivation for engagement to build deep 
democratic structures both locally and globally. 
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5  Ever since our cultural discourse moved into the "postmodern 
condition", questions regarding truth and justice have generated 
suspicion.  We seem to be shy even of raising the questions.  
Unlike Pontius Pilate, who reportedly raised the question but 
would not wait for an answer, the postmodern gesture is to point 
at the futility of the question itself.  If there is no point in 
truth, then the truth in the context of elusive concepts such as 
justice or freedom in general, or economic justice or democracy, 
in particular, would seem to be beside the point. 
  Modern economists, in particular, have  progressively 
abandoned the territory they call normative economics.  Even 
within the utilitarian tradition the move from cardinal to 
ordinal utility meant giving up any kind of interpersonal 
comparisons.  Lately, the move to identify economic discourse as 
simply rhetorical has generated both tolerance of and skepticism 
about normative issues.  This is an important paradox that needs 
to be addressed. 
  The value of looking at the rhetorical aspects of economics 
and politics is undeniable.  Skepticism, at least as an initial 
methodological gesture in the Cartesian sense, is also valuable.  
However, much of value is also at stake here.  If rhetoric and 
skepticism are also the endpoint of the inquiry then we are left 
at best with a Humean empiricist way of looking at the world.  
Justice, in particular economic justice, can then be nothing more 
than a prudent convention simply because we are not better, 
nobler beings than we appear to be. 
  Is there any way then to come to terms with postmodern 
skepticism of democracy and economic justice?  It is not an easy 
task once the fundamental premises of modernism are interrogated. 
  An initial gesture of doubting is made necessary simply 
because of the foundational approach of modern political and 
economic theory.  One might look for ways to deconstruct such 
writing as there is, on economic justice by way of supplement, 
trace and difference in a Derridean fashion.  Such textual 
analysis can expose the play of metonymy and metaphor even in 





However, I will take a not unrelated but still somewhat 
different path here.  I will interrogate some of the foundational 
premises of modernism in order to construct an alternative, non-
foundational approach to economic justice and democracy.  Leaving 
epistemological and ontological assumptions of modernism behind - 
one might think - would lead us to a terrain more amenable to the 
discussion of normative issues of justice.  However,as I have 
already hinted, here we will come up against some further 
problems raised by postmodernism.  Put succinctly, the problem is 
as follows: is it possible to give up all the modernist 
assumptions and end up with anything but nihilism?  This way of 
putting the question carries some force.  Indeed there are many 
postmodernists who accept nihilism as the logical (?) outcome of 
their positions.  If true, then a discourse on economic justice 
(or any other kind of justice)or democracy is simply a 
logocentric exercise.  Perhaps justice and  also need to be 
deconstructed, even destroyed (destruktion in Heidegger’s 
language).  However, following a modal logic consistent with the 
movement away from the modernist binary logic one can actually 
deny that a denial of some of modernist assumptions will 
inevitably lead to nihilism with respect to normative issues such 
as justice.2  The same modal logic allows one to also hold, 
without holding onto transcendental versions of modernism, that a 
deconstruction of economic justice is only a necessary preamble 
to an equally necessary constructive discourse on justice.  Thus, 
once again, the aim of this paper is to rescue democracy and 
economic justice from floundering by overcoming the conscious or 
unconscious epistemological commitments of both modernism and 
postmodernism.  In order to fix ideas and put the positions 
developed later in perspective I begin with a brief discussion of 
modernism and postmodernism in general.  I then look at some of 
                     
2 This line of thought also has an irresistible Madhyamika  tendency in the tradition of the famous Buddhist 
philosopher Nagarjuna. With his fourfold negation of propositions (Catuskoti), Nagarjuna provides a rigorous way 
of proceeding beyond both Aristotlean and dialectical logic.With the exception of one study on Derrida and 





the claims advanced by postmodernists such as Foucault, 
Braudrillard, Rorty and Lyotard about normativity in general 
under postmodernism.3  The problems for a discourse on economic 
justice if such claims can be accepted can be recognized quite 
easily after this exercise.  I then discuss the undiscussable, 
namely economic justice and democracy without modernist 
assumptions.4  In the process of doing so I necessarily take a 
critical view of some of the positions articulated by the 
postmodernists mentioned before.  However, this does not lead, I 
believe, back to the camp of conventional modernism.  In fact 
without being a camp follower I am able to travel some distance 
with Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari and even Nietzsche.5  However, 
the conclusion is that justice, in particular economic justice, 
is too important an issue to leave to only French, German and 
American philosophers (living and dead).  Economists and other 
social scientists need to create a conversation among themselves 
in this arena.  One long dead German philosopher, Hegel, can 
surprisingly be brought to life in this context.  I show how a 
                     
 3 I have not here distinguished between postmodernism and poststructuralism.  Instead of an exegesis of 
schools of thought I am interested in specific premises, arguments and conclusions of particular thinkers.  
Postmodernism serves as a broad enough umbrella to include many such thinkers.  As I discuss in the next section, 
in this sense, postmodernism can be contrasted usefully with modernism.  The proof of the intellectual pudding, 
however, is in the structure of specific arguments and not in how the arguments are labeled.  However, I do 
emphasize the commonality among the individual thinkers whenever it exists. The more complex evolution of 
Foucault’s thought is addresses in Khan (2001). 
4 As the technically informed reader may guess, the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model and the two 
fundamental theorems of existence and optimality of general equilibrium are rejected here. This is for two reasons. 
First, as Stglitz (1994) and others have shown the existence of informational and other imperfections lead to 
pervasive external effects invalidating the Arrow-Debreu model. Second, and more important for this paper, the 
normative concept of Pareto efficiency is too subjective and weak a standard for ethics and practical policymaking. 
An alternative standard based on a more objective valuation of individuality and capabilities with both Aristotlean 
and Hegelian connections (Sen 1992,1999; Sen and Nussbaum, 1992; Nussbaum, 1995; Khan, 1995 , 1998) can be a 
more solid standard of ethical evaluations. 
5 The careful reader will notice that I do not directly use the most obvious gambit offered by postmodernists, namely 
its self-referential inconsistency.  Most philosophically unsophisticated versions of postmodernism in fact are self-
refuting since they cannot assert the truth of their own positions while denying truth of any kind.  However, I read 
Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari and that old ‘maestro of suspicion’, to use Ricoeur’s phrase, Nietzsche as not simple 
relativists, but rather as radical critics of reason.  Thus in Deleuze and Guattari, and in Derrida among the 
contemporaries there are arguments that rationally constrain reason without falling into self-contradiction.  My 






particular reading of Hegel can help in the positive discussion 
of rights, freedom, democracy and justice without foundations in 
the penultimate substantive section of this paper. With this 
restoration, in the postmodern context, the fictions about 
democracy and justice are exposed, and thus deeper forms of both 
democracy and justice can be explored in a world of economic 
frictions and political conflicts. It turns out that this is also 
a world of hope, struggle and ‘postmodern’ possibilities. 
 
I.  Modernism and Postmodernism 
  One could of course speak of both modernism and 
postmodernism in the plural.  Exegetically minded scholars are 
particularly keen on doing so.  However, my purpose is not to 
"interpret" or "reinterpret" this or that modern or postmodern 
thinker, but to unearth the common epistemological, ontological, 
moral (or amoral!) and aesthetic ground shared by them. 
  Ihab Hassan writes in a section of the conclusion of The 
Postmodern Turn: Essays in Postmodern Theory and Culture, "that 
the post modern debate drifted from America to Europe."  In his 
The Dismemberment of Orpheus Hasan had already asked, "when did 
the Modern period end?" and had gone on to identify the turning 
point as early as the 1920s in literature.  He asks the reader to 
contrast Edmund Wilson’s Axel’s Castle: A Study in the 
Imaginative Literature with his own collection.  The former 
carried a discussion of symbolism, Yeats, Valery, Elliot, Proust, 
Joyce and Stein.  Hasan’s own text weaves its way through 
pataphysics, surrealism, Kafka, existentialism, literature, Genet 
and Beckett.  Hasan thinks Stein contributed to both but the 
crucial text is Finnegan’s Wake.  Therefore, he asks, "If we can 
arbitrarily state literary modernism includes certain works 
between Jarry’s Ubu Roi (1896) and Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake (1931) 
where will we arbitrarily say that Postmodernism begins?"  Aware 
of the irony of the origins of the postmodern turn he ends by 





as different as Barth, artheleme, eckers, ense, lancheft, 
orges, recht, urroughs, utir.  Query: But is not Ubu Roi itself 
as Postmodern as it is Modern?"  Despite this problem of 
demarcation Hasan’s series of dichotomies may nevertheless be a 
set of useful contrasts.  
  
 












































  As the astute reader will notice in the history of 
literature at least many of the postmodern traits are shared by 
many modernist works themselves.  In his 1980 essay Hasan also 
presented "Five Paratactical Propositions about the Culture of 
Postmodernism": 
1.  Postmodernism depends on the violent transhumanization of 
the earth, wherein terror and totalitarianism, fractions 
and whole, poverty and power summon each other.  The end 
may be cataclysm and/or the beginning of genuine 
planetization, a new era for the One and the Many... 
2.  Postmodernism derives from the technological extension of 
consciousness, a kind of twentieth century gnosis … The 
result is a paradoxical view of consciousness as 
information and history as happening. 
3.  Postmodernism, at the same time, reveals itself in the 
dispersal of the human—that is, of language—in the 
immanence of discourse and mind … 
4.  Postmodernism, as a mode of literary change, could be 
distinguished from the older avant-gardes (Cubism, 
Futurism, Dadaism, Surrealism, etc.) as well as from 
modernism.  Neither Olympian and detached like the latter 





suggests a different kind of accommodation between art 
and society … 
5.  Postmodernism veers toward open, playful, optative, 
disjunctive, displaced, or indeterminate forms, a 
discourse of fragments, an ideology of fracture, a will 
to unmaking, an invocation of silences—veers toward all 
these and yet implies their very opposites, their 
antithetical realities.  It is as if Waiting for Godot 
found an echo, if not an answer, in Superman. 
  Leaving aside the genre-specific question of Dadaism, 
earlier included in cataloguing of postmodern traits and now 
seemingly excluded, one might wish to probe further about the 
condition for cataclysm or alternatively, genuine planetization 
mentioned in the first proposition.  Likewise, the tantalizing 
suggested "different kind of accommodation between art and 
society" needs a kind of elaboration that is never offered.  The 
fifth proposition offers some help in characterizing postmodern 
forms.  We will see later that Derrida's characterizations of 
structure, sign and play take us to some of these conclusions 
through a more rigorous poststructuralist route. 
  Jean François Lyotard in his The Postmodern Condition (1979) 
claims that the term postmodern "designates the state of our 
culture following the transformations which, since the end of the 
nineteenth century have altered the game rules for science, 
literature and the arts."  The more frequently used, or at least 
the more popular among the American academics is his 
characterization of the postmodern as "incredulity toward 
metanarratives." 
  Lyotard tries to be quite explicit about the 
modern/postmodern distinction.  Thus he wants to use the term 
modern to "designate any science that legitimates itself with 
reference to a metadiscourse … making an explicit appeal to some 





hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or 
working subject, or the creation of wealth." 
  Although he is critical of both Hegel and Marx (and other 
"totalizing" philosophers), Lyotard's further analysis of 
scientific knowledge as a form of discourse in bourgeois society 
is influenced by Marx's theory of the circuit of capital.  
Lyotard makes a distinction between "payment knowledge" and 
"investment knowledge" and focuses on their circulation: 
 
It is not hard to visualize learning circulating along the 
same lines as money, instead of for its "educational" value 
or political … importance; the pertinent distinction would 
no longer be between knowledge and ignorance, but rather, as 
is the case with money, between "payment knowledge" and 
"investment knowledge." 
           ( The 
Postmodern Condition, p. 6) 
 
Characterizing eclecticism as "the degree zero” of contemporary 
culture, Lyotard (1979, p. 76) goes on to locate its basis in the 
power of capital: 
 
When power is that of capital and not that of party, the 
"transavantgardist" or "postmodern" (in Jencks's sense) 
solution proves to be better adapted than the antimodern 
solution.  Eclecticism is the degree zero of contemporary 
general culture: one listens to reggae, watches a Western, 
eats McDonald's food for lunch and local cuisine for dinner, 
wears Paris perfume in Tokyo and "retro" clothes in Hong 
Kong; knowledge is a matter for TV games.  It is easy to 
find a public for eclectic works.  By becoming kitsch, art 
panders to the confusion which reigns in the "tastes" of the 
patrons.  Artists, gallery owners, critics and public wallow 
together in the "anything goes", and the epoch is one of 





fact that of money; in the absence of aesthetic criteria, 
it remains possible and useful to assess the value of works 
of art according to the profits they yield.  Such realism 
accommodates all tendencies, just as capital accommodates 
all "needs", providing that the tendencies and needs have 
purchasing power.  As for taste, there is no need to be 
delicate when one speculates or entertains oneself. 
 
  Lyotard seemingly gives up on the moral (hence questions of 
justice/injustice) in favor of the aesthetic and a state of mind 
like the Kantian sublime.  In his later writings something like a 
fourth critique of Kant is attempted to salvage something from 
the ruins of epistemological and moral nihilism via the sublime 
and a mode of moral sensibility.6  In the next section I question 
this move and present as an alternative a nonfoundational 
discourse on economic justice that does not require assumptions 
of an absolutely integrated subject, complete determinacy and 
universality.  Readers of the postmodern literature are already 
familiar with the writings of Foucault, Lacan, Derrida and others 
on these.  So without further reviewing what these others have 
said and the already large (and largely unilluminating derivative 
literature), I will proceed to examine the serious problems for a 
discourse on economic justice that an acceptance of the 
postmodern turn problems for a discourse on economic justice that 
an acceptance of the postmodern turn poses. 
 
II.  Postmodernism and Justice: Some Problems 
  In at least one influential self-presentation of the 
postmodern condition, cynicism would appear to emerge as the 
ground bass against which other baroque virtuosities are 
displayed.  Lyotard (1988) seems to provide an explanation, even 
a justification for this state of affairs: 
                     
  6Thus under the subsection "Pretext" in The Differend, Lyotard refers to Kant's "historical-political texts" 





The "philosophies of history" that inspired the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries claim to assure passages over the 
abyss of heterogeneity or the event.  The names which are 
those of "our history" oppose counterexamples to their 
claim.—Everything real is rational, everything rational is 
real: "Auschwitz" refutes speculative doctrine.  This crime 
at least, which is real, is not rational. —Everything 
proletarian is communist, everything communist is 
proletarian: "Berlin 1953, Budapest 1956, Czechoslovakia 
1968, Poland 1980" (I could mention others) refute the 
doctrine of historical materialism: the workers rose up 
against the Party.—Everything democratic is by and for the 
people, and vice versa: "May 1968" refutes the doctrine of 
parliamentary liberalism.  The social in its everydayness 
puts representative institutions in check. —Everything that 
is the free play of supply and demand is favorable for the 
general enrichment, and vice versa: the "crisis of 1911 and 
1929" refutes the post-Keynesian revision of that doctrine.  
The passages promised by the great doctrinal syntheses end 
in bloody impasses.  Whence the sorrow of the spectators in 
this bloody end of the twentieth century. 
       ( The Differend: Phrases 
in Dispute, pp. 179-180) 
 
As the title of his book indicates, Lyotard wants to reduce all 
discourse to disputes between different "phrase-regimes."  
Lyotard wishes to distinguish a differend from a litigation. The 
former is a conflict that cannot be "equitably resolved for lack 
of a rule of judgment applicable to both arguments."  Although he 
does not come out completely against theories that can make some 
kind of ontological claim about the structure of the social world 
and history as Rorty and Fish clearly do, his book veers 
dangerously close to the kind of anything goes vein of relativism 





combination of the sense of responsibility and the sense of 
despair his works display so clearly.  It is the particular 
clarity with respect to the past history but at the same time a 
certain opaqueness with respect to our ability to make history 
that makes Lyotard's reading of Kant so poignant. 
  Lyotard's heterodox reading of Kant distinguishes among 
cognitive, practical and speculative reason in terms of their 
being different phrase-regimes.  He reads Kant's late writings on 
freedom, democracy, progress and perpetual peace as a nascent 
fourth critique of political reason.  However, from this 
beginning he turns to a skeptical aesthetic mode, trying 
heroically at the same time to connect the aesthetic judgment 
with practical reason or ethics.  "… enthusiastic pathos 
conserves an aesthetic validity, it is an energetic sign, a 
tensor of Wunsch … The infinity of the Idea draws to itself all 
the other capacities, that is, all the other faculties, and 
produces an Affect "of the vigorous kind", characteristic of the 
sublime" (p. 169). 
  At best, however, this can only lead to an agnostic position 
with respect to any moral judgment including the justice or 
injustice of social norms.  In producing what he intends to be a 
politicized reading of the Kantian sublime, Lyotard claims: 
 
you are phrasing … not according to the rule of direct 
presentation proper to cognitives but according to the free, 
analogical presentation to which dialectical phrases in 
general are held.  You can then call upon certain phenomena 
given through intuition, but they cannot, however, have the 
value of exempla or of schemata in your argument … A single 
referent—say a phenomenon grasped in the field of human 
history—can be used qua example, to present the object of 
discourse of despair, but also … to present analogically the 
object of the discourse of emancipation.  And along with 





republican politics, and be a moral politician. (Lyotard, 
p. 163) 
 
But there is seemingly no way to justify either "the discourse of 
despair" or the "moral politician."  If one weakens the case of 
morality so much and still wishes to defend it, one is left to 
make the gesture of a Tertullian, who said that he believed in 
God because it was absurd. 
  It is thus doubtful that the sublime as a figure of radical 
heterogeneity can rescue us from giving up the quest for morality 
and justice.  The whole issue degenerates into an "as-if" game 
analogous to the defense of the maximizing agent by the Chicago 
economists. 
 
Because the feeling of the sublime is an affective paradox, 
the paradox of feeling publicly and as a group that 
something which is "formless" alludes to a beyond of 
experience, that feeling constitutes an "as-if presentation" 
of the Idea of civil society and even of cosmopolitical 
society, and thus an as-if presentation of the Idea of 
morality, right where that Idea nevertheless cannot be 
presented, within experience. 
          
  (Lyotard, p. 170) 
 
  An even more extreme drift towards a hazy relativism 
characterizes the writings of Baudillard.  In case of 
Baudrillard, as Christopher Norris with respect to Lyotard and 
some deconstructionists points out there is a much greater 
willingness "to jettison every last notion of truth, justice, or 
critical understanding."  Norris goes on to add provocatively: 
 
Another—exemplified by Lyotard—is the more refined version 
of postmodernist thinking that preserves those ideas but 





speculative (ethical) order and cognitive truth-claims of 
whatever kind.  Then again, there is the turn toward that 
thoroughly depoliticised version of deconstructionist 
thought that reduces all concepts to metaphors, all 
philosophy to an undifferentiated "kind of writing", and 
hence all history to a play of ungrounded figural 
representations.  In each case—so I have argued—theory has 
served as an escape-route from pressing political questions 
and a pretext for avoiding any serious engagement with real-
world historical events.  Worst of all, these ideas deprive 
critical thought of one resource most needful at present, 
i.e. the competence to judge between good and bad arguments, 
reason and rhetoric, truth-seeking discourse and the 
"postmodern" discourse of mass-induced media simulation. 
          
  (Norris, p. 44) 
 
  A notable exception to this trend is Derrida, especially in 
his recent writings.  I have argued elsewhere about the ethical 
aspects of the discourse presented by Deleuze and Guattari (in 
their case a similar assertion is made by Foucault in the preface 
to Anti-Oedipus).  However, Derrida's formulations, when followed 
carefully, I will try to show, can be helpful in formulating a 
positive discourse on justice in general and economic justice in 
particular.  In his response to Searle, Derrida denies that 
deconstruction suspends reference.  Furthermore, he equates 
différance and reference, at least provisionally. 
 
A few moments ago, I insisted on writing, at least in 
quotation marks, the strange and trivial formula, "real-
history-of-the-world", in order to mark clearly that the 
concept of text or of context which guides me embraces and 
does not exclude the world, reality, history.  Once again … 
as I understand it (and I have explained why), the text is 





the library.  It does not suspend reference—to history, to 
reality, to being, and especially not to the other since to 
say of history, of the world, of reality, that they always 
appear in an experience, hence in a movement of 
interpretation which contextualizes them according to a 
network of differences and hence of referral to the other, 
is surely to recall that alterity (difference) is 
irreducible.  Différance is a reference and vice versa. 
          
  (Derrida, Limited Inc., p. 137) 
 
Much earlier in his "Structure, Sign and Play," Derrida had 
remarked: 
Tounée vers la présence, perdue ou impossible, de l'origine 
absente, cette thematique structuraliste de l'immédiateté 
rompue est donc triste, négative, nostalgique, coupable, 
rousseauiste, de la pensée du jeu dont l'affirmation 
nietzschéene, l'affirmation joyeuse du jeu du monde et de 
l'innocence du devenir, l'affirmation d'un monde de signes 
sans faute, sans vérité, sans origine, offert à une 
interprétation active, serait l'autre face.  Cette 
affirmation détermine alors le-non--centre autrement que 
comme perte du centre.  Et elle joue sans sécurité.  Car il 
y a un jeu sûr: celui que se limite à la substitution de 
pièces données et existantes, presentes.  Dans le hasard 
absolu, l'affirmation se livre aussi à l'indetermination 
génétique, à l'aventure seminale de la trace. 
          
 Derrida 
 
Turned towards the presence, lost or impossible, of the 
absent origin, this structuralist thematic of broken 
immediateness is thus the sad, negative, nostalgic, guilty, 





Nietzschean affirmation, the joyful affirmation of the 
free play of the world of signs without want, without truth, 
without origin would be the other face.  This affirmation 
then determines the non-center as other than the loss of the 
center.  And it plays without security.  For there is a sure 
free play: that which is limited to the substitution of the 
given and existing, present pieces.  In absolute randomness 
affirmation gives itself up also to the genetic 
indeterminacy, to the seminal adventure of the trace. 
            ( m y  
translation) 
 
Is it possible to give expression to the capacity for free play, 
the fulfillment of need/desire without lapsing into mere "phrase-
regimes"?  Surprisingly an affirmative answer to this is 
possible.  A rigorous blend of the "modernist" Hegel with 
poststructuralist Derrida is a tantalizing possibility that can 
advance the discourse on justice in the cultural context of 
postmodernism in interesting ways.  In the rest of the paper I 
will show that such a revised, non-foundational epistemology does 
not lead to a free floating ontological and moral relativism.  At 
the same time, by elaborating on Lacan's elucidation of the idea 
of the subject, I construct a dynamic concept of the subject so 
that "agency" is a concept that can be used even when shorn of 
its "traditional" modernist epistemological baggage.  Finally, by 
bringing these concepts in direct confrontation with the world of 
economic relations, the question of rights, democracy and 
economic justice can be reformulated in the "postmodern" context 
without postmodern "phrase-regimes."7 
                     
7  The reader will notice that I have not discussed Foucault’s many interesting contributions. Lack of space 
is one reason. But the more important reason is the set of deep ambiguities in Foucault. Thus, he asks that 
we live with hyperpessimism, but at the same time endorses revolt. Some have conjectured that Foucault 
may have been struggling to reach an ethical position that would more consistently support a revolt-
oriented, freedom-seeking stance. The following quote from one of his late 70s writings would tend to 






III. Democracy, Markets and Economic Justice Without 
Foundations 
  If the anti-foundational battle cry of the postmodernists is 
not to lead us to the doors of nihilism and relativism, what 
epistemological turn must be taken?  Put in another way, is there 
a way to avoid foundations and speak of economic justice (or 
justice in general) at all? 
  Surprisingly, Hegel raised precisely this issue in his 
Philosophy of Right.  Earlier, in both his Phenomenology of 
Spirit and Science of Logic, Hegel had shown how to dissolve the 
standpoint of the subject and begin the investigation of thinking 
without presuppositions.  Quite remarkably this strategy allowed 
him to avoid the foundationalist fallacies of positing a 
predetermined given and a privileged determiner.  At the same 
time he was able to avoid the trap of "anything goes" 
philosophical attitude. 
  Rejecting natural rights and justice on the grounds that 
these are foundational is not logically equivalent to saying that 
there is no alternative route to justice.  Only a binary logic 
that reduces the universe of discourse to natural rights or 
nothing else can consistently claim that the denial of natural 
rights is to be equated with the proposition that it is not 
possible to talk about rights at all.  Or, to reduce all such 
talk, as Lyotard does, to mere phrase-regimes can hardly be the 
most logical alternative if one can find a way of talking about 
rights and justice in a non-foundational way. 
  In fact, we can reject the standard phrase-regimes of 
contemporary ethics—utilitarianism, deontology and communitariasm 
— without falling prey to nihilism.  Ironically, all three of 
                                                                  
There is no right to say: ‘revolt for me, a final liberation is coming for everyone.’ But I do not 
agree with someone who says: ‘It is useless to revolt. It will always come to the same thing.’ One 
does not make the law for the person who risks his life before power. Is there or is there not a 
reason to revolt? 





these positions, although they contradict one another, also 
deny in various ways that reason can prescribe the ends of human 
actions.  Thus, postmodernism, in a certain sense, carries the 
"rational" skepticism of these modernist positions to its 
ultimate irrationality. 
  The key to avoid both the limited rationality of modernism 
and the unlimited irrationality of certain kinds of postmodernism 
is to see right and justice within a framework of social 
interaction.  In contrast with Nietzsche morality cannot be 
reduced to an individual's will to power in such a social 
context.  Only rights recognized by others reciprocally can be 
rights as such. 
  The specific relations that constitute the economic 
interactions in society can then be brought under such a 
framework of rights.  These rights are non-foundational because 
in order to build up this structure we begin from nothing but 
self-determining social individuals and their interactions.  
Initially, nothing but an abstract right of property in self can 
be seen with such beginnings.  The important point to note is 
that no assumptions regarding the nature of individual self or 
any appeal to the natural laws need to be made. 
  Starting with such abstract rights of property, it is 
possible to move to rights within family, civil society and the 
state.  Some of Hegel's views on these (especially family, 
constitutional monarchy or estates) are certainly outdated.  The 
question can even be raised if these were the right prescriptions 
in his own time.   
  However, using Hegel's non-foundational approach, it is 
possible to rationally construct a structure of rights within 
which economic rights will take a prominent position.  Economic 
rights have as their sphere both family and civil society.  The 
sharing of household roles through mutual recognition between 
consenting adults who need not be heterosexuals is the 





important aspect is the protection and nurturing of children.  
Hence children, as soon as they can think and articulate their 
thoughts must also be thought of as bearers of right.  The 
sharing of economic resources without gender or age bias is the 
major issue of household economic justice.  It can only be 
resolved by recognizing rights that are real and rational. 
  The largest sphere of economic justice, is of course within 
the economic sphere itself.  Here, the markets for labor8, 
capital and consumption goods both facilitate self-determination 
and hamper it.9  Markets facilitate self-determination by making 
it possible to exchange one kind of property for another 
according to the self-affirming needs of the individuals.  
However, under large-scale organizations owned by private 
individuals and pervasive inequalities in the distribution of 
wealth and income only some are allowed to use the market for 
their self-determination.  Furthermore, pervasive monetary 
calculations orient even these individuals towards measuring 
their worth in purely monetary terms.  A Veblenesque competition 
for more money in order to have more worth results in an endless 
striving to increase wealth.  The production of a civilized 
cultured way of life may be an accident and usually not valued as 
much as the pursuit of wealth.  Economic justice under such a 
regime therefore is not Pareto Optimality.  It is not the 
distributive justice of equating marginal product with real wage.  
It is not even Rawlsian maximin criterion, although under 
conditions of extreme inequality it may be a good first move. 
  Economic justice may require more equality of resources than 
there is at present.  But as a coherent concept, it demands 
freedom as self-determination of individuals in the economic 
                     
8 The market for labor or (in Marx’s terms) labor power as a commodity gives rise to special problems. These are 
analyzed separately in Khan(2001), starting from Marx’s early analysis of alienation and later analysis of abstract 
labor in Capital. 
9 This critical strategy has something in common with Polanyi’s critique of marketization of land, labor and money 
as fictitious commodities. It does, differ, however in acknowledging a contradictory, but transitional role of markets 
in facilitating individual self-determination. The double movement arises in a deeper way from the (at least partial) 





sphere.  Since the structure of private ownership capitalism 
leads to "freedom" for a few, such a system cannot be just.  The 
late socialist system also was not just, since resources were 
politically controlled and markets were suppressed even where 
they could be used to further the self-determination of 
individuals.  Of the twin purposes of markets, ---self-
determination and wealth creation--- the former is an end in 
itself, while the latter is merely a means.  Economic justice 
with respect to the operation of markets, therefore requires 
creating a structure of ownership and distribution that will 
allow self-determination for its own sake and also creation of 
quantitatively enough and qualitatively the right kind of wealth 
for making the need-satisfaction of a progressively more 
civilized society possible. 
 
Given this clarification of economic justice without foundational 
premises, is it possible to claim that democracy means the 
upholding of such justice? The answer is that it does so, but 
only in an abstract way. To make democracy and justice concrete 
we need to specify theoretically at least the minimally adequate 
institutional requirements. This will be done in the context of 
further developing  democratic theory as promised at the outset. 
However, there is one more difficult postmodern hurdle to jump 
before this can be done rigorously. 
 
IV.  Is there a subject? 
  Even if the foregoing argument is accepted, there still 
remains a final problem.  Indeed this problem is thorny enough to 
make the task of plucking the flowers of democracy and economic 
justice seem completely hopeless.  This is the problem of agency 
or—as it is well known in the French postmodernist and 





  In France it was made popular by Althusser's discussions 
of ideology.10  However, the deeper philosophical and 
psychoanalytic motivations for considering the subject 
problematic have been articulated by Lacan. 
  In Lacan's view the subject has both consciousness and 
unconscious motivations.  The unconscious part is the source of 
the problem.  No matter how coherent (and thus capable of agency) 
the person might seem to be as a conscious agent, the unconscious 
is in fact quite chaotic.   
  Lacan buttresses his claim with the hypothesis that the 
structure of the unconscious is the same as the structure of 
repressed signifiers in early entry into the symbolic realm by 
the child.  This chain of repressed signifiers hides the actual 
incoherence of the subject's subjectivity. 
  Lacan's position raises several intriguing possibilities for 
explaining ideology, not the least of which is the explanation of 
patriarchy.  By an assimilation of what he calls the "phallus" as 
a transcendental signifier while other contradictory signifiers 
are simply suppressed, patriarchy gains a semblance of 
naturalness.  As long as the socialization processes that make 
such simultaneous transcendence and repression possible, 
patriarchy cannot be eradicated.  More generally, the much 
vaunted individualism in a bourgeois society can also be seen as 
a suppression of all contradictory tendencies and relegation of 
such tendencies to the unconscious. 
  Undoubtedly there is a great deal of truth in this, even if 
one does not go all the way towards accepting all the pieces of 
this neo-Freudian poststructuralist semiotic psychoanalysis.  
However, the leap from a nuanced analysis of the unconscious 
aspects of the psyche to the conclusion that there is no subject 
                     
  10See, for example, Althusser's essays on ideology in For Marx and Lenin and Philosophy.  Althusser 





with a moral capacity for action is illegitimate for several 
reasons.11   
  First, the idea of a subject can have a limited warrant even 
if the unconscious motivations are discerned as contradictory.  
This is close to the idea of a juridical subject.  The potential 
for moral capacity of such a subject is weaker than the 
formulation that follows.  Nevertheless, even such weakly 
constituted, quasi-juridical subjects can serve as putative 
agents of moral actions. 
  The second and more important objection to the Lacanian 
fallacy is that Lacan's position can actually be used effectively 
to reformulate the view of a subject.  In fact, recognizing the 
inevitable unconscious contradictions allows one to distinguish 
between two kinds of subjecthood in a dynamic sense.12 
  On the one hand we have the (relatively) unaware subject who 
is the ideological construct "individual."  Such a person may be 
shored up by all the reassuring dogmas and ideologies of our 
contemporary society.  The crack in the mirror where such a 
person observes himself is invisible as long as he is ignorant of 
his own inner turmoils at the conscious level.  This is not to 
say that archaic thought-processes or emotions do not invade the 
person from time to time.  And this happens, not as is usually 
assumed, just in a dream-state.  As Lear (1990, p. 37) expresses 
it in connection with his (re)reading of Anna O.'s fantasy: 
 
It is because fantasies of mental functioning are pressed 
from the beginning of mental life and actually influence 
mental functioning that psychoanalysis can be a "talking 
cure."  If mental functioning were as remote from a person's 
self-understanding as, say brain functioning, there would be 
no reason to think that a person could tell us about his 
                     
  11It is not clear if Lacan himself would go so far, but most postmodernists, French and non-French alike 
(e.g., Foucault and Rorty), have taken this position. 
  12I hope it will become clear in the following discussion that actually there is a continuum of subjects 





mental processes.  But it seems that even the most archaic 
unconscious mental process contains within it an implicit 
fantasied "theory" of that process.  A "theory" of the 
mental process is part of the person's (perhaps unconscious) 
experience of that process.  Thus the fantasied "theory" 
becomes part and parcel of the mental process, and in 
altering the fantasy one alters the mental process itself. 
 
  Lear explains that the strangeness (to us) of the above 
formulation comes only from our habit of equating the fantasy to 
"a mental image, projected on the screen of the mind."  But the 
confusion dissolves if we ask: how can such an image affect 
mental functioning?  Without assuming in a circular way that 
mental functioning is affected by images of its functioning, no 
answer consistent with the mental image equation seems possible.  
The way out of this conundrum is to reject the equation itself.  
As Lear puts it: 
 
A person's subjectivity is powerful not merely because it 
is striving for expression but also because it may be 
expressed archaically.  Archaic mental functioning knows no 
firm boundary between mind and body, and so archaic mind is 
incarnate in the body.  Although fantasies may be expressed 
in images, they may also occur in paralyses, vomiting, skin 
irritations, spasms, ulcers, etc., and even by being 
dramatically acted out by the person whose fantasy it is.  
In this way a person's subjectivity permeates his being.  
So, for example, if a person's fantasied "theory" of 
catharsis is that it is an emotional purgation, this 
"theory" should be manifest in various aspects of that 
person's experience: he may feel "drained", or "depleted", 
"spent", "exhausted", "empty", after a cathartic emotional 
experience.  This is the sense in which every person must 






  Actually, Lacan's discussion of "petit objet “a" shows 
that within the context of a radical objects relations theory the 
development of the homlette does leave behind residues of archaic 
mental functioning.  Without considerable indulgence in a 
"talking cure," perhaps of the Lacanian variety, one may not be 
able to give conscious, conceptualized symbolic form to these 
archaic fantasies.  But this in no way negates the fact that such 
is the way of the unconscious expressing itself. 
  Thus, the insertion of the child into the symbolic universe 
creates both repression and the possibilities for overcoming the 
repression.  It is this second aspect of the symbolic that holds 
the subject's potential for moral capacity.   
  As a person yet unable to fully conceptualize her condition, 
she is not incapable of a moral personality.  As Jonathan Cohen 
argues persuasively in his "A View of the Moral Landscape of 
Psychoanalysis," the trained analyst can perceive both the moral 
capacities and moral failures of such "subjects."  Conceptually, 
the argument simply establishes the possibility of the 
subjecthood of a person.  The precise content of the subjectivity 
may indeed be unhealthy in a clinical sense.  But such 
characterization only re-establishes the moral potential of the 
person as an agent.  Denying this potential is itself an act of 
ideological repression.   
  Such considerations lead us to think of a second type of 
moral agent.  This is a subject whose awareness has unfolded to 
such an extent that she is able to conceive of herself as a moral 
agent.  However, such awareness also encompasses the repression 
that accompanies our insertion into the symbolic.  Thus her moral 
insights about herself and the world also include a recognition f 
human vulnerability, epistemic shortcomings and the need for a 
twofold dialogue.  This dialogue is, on the one hand, a 
conversation within oneself13 and, on the other, a dialogue with 
                     
  13Or, to be more precise, an "interior monologue" where the unconscious processes are symbolized, 





the outside world.  Depending on the state of the individual 
psychoanalytic therapy may or may not be necessary for such 
subjectivity to occur.  However, as I have argued elsewhere 
(Khan, 1992, 1993a,b, 1995), in a just and democratic society, 
the resources for such therapy will be available to all. 
  Here a further source of confusion may arise.  There is a 
widespread view both within and outside of psychoanalysis that 
analysis "shrinks the realm of the moral responsibility."  As 
Nancy Sherman puts it, "there is the surface paradox that while 
morality is ubiquitous, the clinical hour boasts of time and 
space that is morally neutral, …" (Sherman, p. 1).  But as 
Wallwork (1991) has argued, psychoanalysis is uncompromisingly 
situated within an ethical perspective.  Sherman follows and 
develops Aristotle's critique of the Socratic denial that one can 
know what is good and fail to act on it.  Aristotle, of course, 
claimed that Socrates' denial of akrasia was simply "against the 
plain facts" (ta phainomena).  
  However, Aristotle views akrasia as an intellectual failure 
rather than a failure of desire.  In discussing Freud's own case 
of being afflicted by the "blindness of the seeing eye" in his 
struggle to understand the case of Miss Lucy R.'s knowing and not 
knowing her love for her employer, Sherman explains: 
 
The Socratic dogma that knowledge can't be tyrannized by 
desire has long been abandoned.  But against Kant, it is not 
simply the inner tribunal of conscience and moral judgment 
that will track down secret but motivating desires.  
Conflictual and concealed mental contents need a therapy of 
self-knowledge that does something other than continue to 
disavow them.  They need to be heard from, in parliamentary 
fashion, and given their own voice as a part of coming to be 
united with avowed and endorsed interests.  Therapeutically 
working through what is disavowed or repressed requires 





decision to submit to the analytic process might be 
thought of as a morally praiseworthy act in the most general 
sense of taking charge of one's character, and pursuing that 
project with courage.  (Sherman, p. 13) 
But the outcome of the therapy when it succeeds is to 
produce a new type of agency. 
No longer split off from emotion's testimony, agency 
takes on a newer and bolder form.  Psychoanalysis transforms 
the notion of moral agency by bringing the emotions to the 
center.  In an ironic way, the "talking therapy" seems to be 
able to bring to moral agency those potential allies that 
moral theory, so often on its own, does not quite know how 
to train or enlist.  (Sherman, pp. 22-23, emphasis mine) 
 
  Therefore, for both types of subjects, it should be 
emphasized, the possibility of acting justly (or otherwise) 
remains open.  In an unjust economy and society, most are victims 
of oppression and injustice.  In a nearly just society, such 
institutionalized injustice disappears, but there could still be 
unjust actions by individuals for which they should be culpable.  
However, in a well ordered society, the view towards crime and 
punishment may be very different from ours.  Instead of 
responding to issues of guilt with conventional punishment, a 
more compassionate, therapeutic approach may be taken. 
  The point of this paper, of course, is not to produce a 
blueprint for a future just society, but to open up the 
possibility of such a discourse even under the postmodern 
conditions of epistemic uncertainty and anti-foundationalism.  
Enough has been said, I believe, to show that even a radical 
epistemic uncertainty is consistent with the two kinds of 
subjects discussed here.  The previous discussion of a Hegelian 
approach to foundationalism was intended to show that anti-
foundationalism is also consistent with a systemic approach to 





scale social and economic structures and at the level of the 
individual's epistemological uncertainties, anti-foundationalism 
need not lead to skepticism, relativism and ultimately nihilism. 
 
V. Democracy and Justice: Fictions, Frictions or 
‘Factions’? 
 
After all this heavy philosophical lifting, it should be clear 
that democracy and justice can be both fictions and frictions. 
Given the ideological distortions embodied in a commodity economy 
that operates in terms of exchange value and the value form in 
general, such fictions are necessary and necessarily true at one 
level. But such fictions are imaginary only in Lacan’s sense, 
i.e., they are neither real nor unreal. Since they are 
simultaneously facts and fictions, one could call them ‘factions’ 
by coining a new term combining both fact and fiction. They 
exist, but their ontological status depends on a deeper causal 
structure that a reality-oriented dialectics can uncover. This 
deeper level, uncovered by an approximately true scientific 
theory of social, economic and political relations shows the 
fictions as unstable forms that can be changed because there are 
deep and permanent frictions within the system. These deep 
conflicts and contradictions create the potential for change. 
Thus these factions also carry the potential for radical, system-
transforming actions.  
  
Thus, the triumph of globalist neoliberalism already seems to 
have passed its moment of glory. Its moment of truth is drawing 
near with increased friction even among the ruling elites of the 
various nation-states and some doubts among the leaders of the 
international organizations. The mass demonstrations against WTO 
in places like Seattle and Quebec City may be harbingers of 
further resistance from below. If so, then Polanyi’s idea of a 






In conjunction with such real world developments, the arguments 
developed here lead to the hope and theoretical possibilities for 
a deeper form of democracy and justice. I have dealt with these 
issues more extensively elsewhere. I will simply summarize the 
major aspects of what I have called the structure of deep 
democracy elsewhere. 
 
Deep democracy is characterized by a dynamic concept of 
citizenship and mass political activism. Grasping theory means 
active practice and further development of theory through 
practice. In order to have a fighting chance of success, certain 
structural and procedural conditions must be fulfilled. 
 
The concept of deep democracy rests crucially on egalitarian 
and anti-authoritarian bases. The set of background conditions 
that were alluded to above, must be specified clearly for it to 
be a coherent concept at all. Furthermore, the requirement that 
every citizen must count genuinely, calls for giving as much 
institutional detail as possible without engaging in the 
hopelessly arrogant exercise of drawing up a blueprint. Gilbert 
(1990) and Khan (1992, 1998) have offered the following 
conditions. The list is not intended to be exhaustive but is 
meant to contain more than a minimal set. As George Kateb (1984) 
and Alan Gilbert (1990) point out, these are also cluster 
properties. A good many of them will need to be realized together 
for democracy to have any depth at all, and for it to have a 
reasonable chance of survival. 
 
 
Cluster conditions of democracy: 





2.  public emphasis on furthering democratic autonomy, 
internationalism, and individuality; 
3.  adequate incomes for all socially recognized work, 
as well as for children, the handicapped, the aged, 
and others not able to work in order to promote 
equality of capability; 
4.  respect for and articulation of differences in 
public life and within parties; 
5.  downward democratic congruence of and within 
ordinary social institutions, including work place 
democracy; 
6.  debate over the history and future of the movement -
- the nature of deep democracy -- in neighborhood 
assemblies and schools; 
7.  cultivation of respect for civil disobedience, 
strikes, and other acts of protest on major public 
issues; 
8.  integration of local and national leaders into 
features of ordinary economic and political life and 
creation of arenas for criticism; 
9.  curtailment of all direct political intervention in 
the arts, religion, and personal life; 
10.establishment of independent judicial, policy, 
communication, and electoral review bodies; 
11.diversity of perspective in communications and 
education; 
12.use of differential, serial referenda on central 
issues; 
13.public funding of issue-oriented committees as well 
as parties; 
14.takeover of some security and civil judicial 





associations; abolition of centralized, especially 
secret police powers and units; 
15.universal public service, military or community; 
restructuring of armed forces in a defensive, 
civilian-oriented direction; removal of 
authoritarianism of rank and status, and institution 
of democratic unit organization, allowing serious 
discussion of policy; 
16.proportional representation of parties; 
17.abolition of the patriarchy; 
18.adoption of democratic child - rearing practices; 
19.full freedom of social intercourse of diverse 
groups; 
20.full freedom of diverse cultural expression; 
21.encouragement of the arts and varying modes of 
expression so that every individual can experience 
and struggle with the challenge of non-dominating 
discourse; 
22.practice of radical forms of individual and group 
subjectivity leading to what Guattari has termed the 
molecular revolution. 
23.adoption of technology and innovation systems which 





  I started by accepting the validity of many of the 
criticisms of modernity by some leading postmodern thinkers.From 
this initial position, I have tried to consider the postmodernist 
positions themselves with regards to democracy and justice by 





postmodernists.  Barring a nihilism that rules out arguments 
entirely, such a procedure seems reasonable. 
  Following this procedure, Lyotard's characterization of the 
discourse on morality and justice as phrase-regimes has been 
shown to lead to an ethical impasse.  His appeal to the Kantian 
sublime, in this context, would seem to be a category mistake.  
The aesthetic category of sublime does not fit the requirements 
of moral judgments even in Kantian terms. 
  Epistemologically, the postmodern dilemma arises from a 
correct critique of metaphysics and transcendentalism.  However, 
the critique is partial and negative.  It is partial in the sense 
that it does not take the challenge of Kant to develop 
normativity seriously enough to explore alternatives as Hegel 
did.  It, therefore, pursues entirely the negative critical path 
leading to thoroughgoing skepticism and nihilism. 
  Derrida's belated attempts to rescue philosophy from a 
linguistic nihilism may succeed.  But it still falls far short of 
offering a positive account of normativity.  A critical 
overcoming of modernism simply cannot be found in the postmodern 
turn.14 
  I have offered as an alternative to natural law and 
transcendental norms an approach based on Hegel's explorations in 
dialectics.  As Winfield and others have pointed out, this 
approach is also anti-foundational.  However, by following the 
rational demands of self-determination, it is possible to break 
out of the vicious circle of skepticism.  Instead, a progressive 
structure starting with the minimum structure of freedom as self-
determination can be built up. 
                     
14 Once again, Foucault is the most complex among the postmoderns. In particular, his notion of biopolitics carries 
within it both a critique of the societies of control and the hope and possibility of overcoming repression and 
domination that he never systematically explored The latter is thus only a latent possibility that Foucault could not 





  Following this alternative offers a way of exploring 
democracy and economic justice.  A concrete set of institutions 
consistent with the development of self-determination can be seen 
as necessary for the idea of economic justice to have meaning.  
In the spheres of production, distribution, exchange, law and 
contracts among others, the development of appropriate economic 
and political institutions allowing this inter-subjective idea of 
freedom to unfold becomes the thematic development of economic 
justice. 
  An important problem in this context is the coherence of the 
concept of the moral subject.  By carefully considering 
poststructuralist psychoanalytical theory of Lacan and others a 
dynamically oriented approach to the question of the subject 
becomes possible.  Pre-Freudian thinkers such as Hegel or Marx 
did not see the formation of the individual in all its deeply 
problematic aspects.  However, the "speaking subject," though not 
innocent (as Hélène Cixous wittily put it), is nevertheless 
capable of agency under specific social and economic conditions.  
A continuum of subjectivity ending with the fully liberated 
individual offers various possible levels of moral agency.  In an 
economically and socially unjust setting radical analytic and 
social interventions will be necessary for these possibilities to 
materialize. 
  Economic justice and democracy, therefore, require a 
coherent set of positive conditions.  They are part and parcel of 
the need for rational autonomy in our world.  Reasonably enough, 
even if we choose to call such a world postmodern, a discourse on 
economic justice and democracy is both necessary and possible.  
It is encouraging to think that such discourses are not just 
phrase-regimes. A realist political economic theory can help us 
look beyond the fiction of the holy trinity of free markets, 
democracy and justice, to find the frictions that underlie this 
trinity, and to face these frictions and contradictions without 





and justice necessarily leads to a deep commitment to uphold 
and extend human rights by building the institutions of deep 
democracy. This is simultaneously the hope and challenge that 
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